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THE BURIAL OF FAMILY LAW
Emily J. Sack*
ABSTRACT
In recent times, family law has appeared to play a prominent role in
public and scholarly debates, as issues such as same-sex marriage and the
proper definition of "family" have become the focus of attention. This Es-
say argues that despite appearances, a broader view of family law develop-
ments over the past several years reveals this law's increasing irrelevance to
legal decisions governing important issues in intimate relationships. More-
over, because family law is so often used as a proxy for issues concerning
women, its diminishment also impairs women's autonomy, both in and out
of family relationships. The Essay briefly reviews some of the current de-
bates in family law and identifies certain principles shared by scholars with
varied perspectives, including a minimization of individual rights and an
insistence on the incorporation of moral values into family structures.
Through an analysis of Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007), the
Essay demonstrates how these common principles have given the legal sys-
tem the opportunity to restrict women's rights.
The Essay then examines several ways in which the legal system has ex-
cluded family law from consideration, including inter-spousal tort immu-
nity, domestic violence, and the domestic relations exception. A discussion
of recent cases such as United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), and
Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005), demonstrates that this ex-
clusion is not a thing of the past. The Essay goes on to delineate how schol-
ars have separated family law from constitutional privacy jurisprudence to
the detriment of individuals in families, particularly women. Finally, the
Essay discusses the isolation of family law in the legal academy, and con-
siders the impact this has had on the status of both family law and women
in the legal system. The Essay concludes that family law must be refocused
to value the rights of individuals in families, including the promotion of
women's autonomy, and to remove moral values from the definition of
family. Otherwise, family law will not be consulted when the critical deci-
sions regarding family relationships are made, but instead will be buried
for good.
* Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law. I presented an early
version of this Essay at the Workshop on Feminist Legal Theory and the Family, which was
held at the Emory University School of Law in September 2007. I would like to thank
Martha Fineman and all of the participants in the workshop for their extremely helpful
comments. I also am grateful to my research assistants, Teresa Giusti and Eric Shamis, for
their excellent work on this project.
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INTRODUCTION
OMETIMES we bury things for safekeeping; sometimes we just
want to give the dead a final resting place. In recent years, the bat-
tle over the development of family law has reached fever pitch. The
debates over the proper definition of family and the legitimacy of moral
judgments as the basis for law governing intimate relationships are just
two examples of the prominence to which family law has risen.' It ap-
pears that family law is a critical tool for understanding and deciding the
issues which we hold most dear. It is a precious commodity that can de-
fine and keep our fundamental values safe. However, despite the appar-
ent importance of family law in recent times, we actually may be
witnessing a body of law in its death throes. A broader view of family law
developments over the past several years instead reveals the failure of
this law to provide a basis for legal decisions concerning important issues
in intimate relationships. Moreover, because family law encompasses
many issues involving women, its diminishment also impairs the rights of
women, both in and out of family relationships.
In Part I of this Essay, I examine some current debates in family law
which assume that this law plays a significant role in guiding the develop-
ment of familial structures and intimate relationships. In Part II, through
the lens of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Gonzales v. Carhart,2 I
analyze how certain commonalities among various sides in these debates
have harmed the position of women in intimate relationships. I argue
1. See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, What Place for Family Privacy?, 67 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1207, 1208 (1999) ("The family has become the symbolic terrain for the
cultural war in which our society is increasingly mired.").
2. 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
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that by minimizing the importance of individual rights and insisting on
the continued relevance of moral values in structuring family relation-
ships, the current focus of family law debates has given the legal system
an opportunity to further restrict women's autonomy. Part III analyzes
the ways in which the legal system has excluded family law from consider-
ation and undermined its significance. I review both the past treatment
of family law by the courts and its continuing exclusion in such recent
decisions as Castle Rock v. Gonzales3 and United States v. Morrison.4 I
then discuss how constitutional right to privacy jurisprudence has been
separated conceptually from family law, and the consequences both for
family law and for women. The last section in Part III examines how the
isolation of family law in the legal academy both confirms and reinforces
its handling by the court system. In the Conclusion, I argue that we must
revise our construction of family law if we are to save it, and women's
autonomy, from an early grave.
I. THE APPARENT PROMINENCE OF FAMILY LAW
A. MORALITY AND INTIMACY
Family law scholars from a variety of perspectives have argued that
family law has had a powerful impact on the decline of the traditional
family. Some of these scholars contend that family law has disassociated
moral values from the law and discredited the right of the law to make
moral judgments about human relationships. 5 Through a series of legal
changes, including the rise of no-fault divorce; custody decisions without
regard to parental sexual behavior; increased recognition of non-marital
partner relationships, including both heterosexual and same-sex couples;
enforceability of pre-nuptial agreements; and the burgeoning of chil-
dren's rights, the institution of the family has ceased to embody moral
values and has become destabilized.6 It can no longer function as an en-
tity that mediates between the individual and the state, and has dis-
integrated into a fragmented collection of individuals with conflicting
desires, regulated only through private decision-making. 7 In order to be
3. 545 U.S. 748 (2005).
4. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
5. See, e.g., Carl Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American
Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1803, 1855-60 (1985); Bruce C. Hafen, Individualism and
Autonomy in Family Law: The Waning of Belonging, 1991 BYU L. REV. 1, 5.
6. See, e.g., MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 36-
39 (1993); Janet L. Dolgin, The Family in Transition: From Griswold to Eisenstadt and
Beyond, 82 GEO. L. J. 1519, 1534-35 (1994); John DeWitt Gregory, Redefining the Family:
Undermining the Family, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 381, 391-92; Hafen, supra note 5, at 26-30;
Harry D. Krause and David D. Meyer, What Family for the 21st Century?, 50 AM. J. COMP.
L. Supp. 101, 103 (2002); Schneider, supra note 5, at 1809-18.
7. See generally REGAN, supra note 6, at 47-51 (discussing the "negotiated family" in
which individual choice holds greater value than obligation and commitment to other fam-
ily members); Carl Schneider, The Channeling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 495 (1992); Hafen, supra note 5, at 4, 25-30; Dolgin, supra note 6, at 1560-61 (noting
that the creation and operation of families has increasingly become a matter of private
choice, where adult family members function as "business associates, free to negotiate the
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revitalized and, most importantly, to protect and promote the welfare of
children, moral values need to be re-infused into family law.8
Other family law scholars welcome and promote diversity in family
forms and relationships while rejecting the gender hierarchy present in
the traditional nuclear family. However, for this group as well, morality
is an important component of family law. 9 Armed with this new concept
of diversity, family law can promote the responsible caretaking and com-
mitment that is critical to children's welfare, while also promoting new
values of fairness and equality.10 This group contends that moral values
have not disappeared from familial relationships, but instead have been
reconfigured into a broader conception of family. Though this group may
not find individual rights antithetical to familial commitments, as the first
group does, both groups of scholars share a focus on the centrality of a
moral vision in family law that promotes interdependency and nurturing
relationships. Thus, both groups believe that family law has the power to
transform social institutions through changes in family relationships.
The growing importance of issues surrounding same-sex marriage has
reinforced the view that family law is now at the forefront of legal dis-
course and will play an influential role in the definition and substance of
our intimate relationships. Some scholars have contended that expanding
definitions of "family" have created instability in these relationships, fos-
tered a lack of responsibility, and ultimately harmed children.11 Others
have welcomed this expansion, and argue that defining marriage to in-
clude same-sex couples can only increase the commitment to familial re-
lations and provide stability to children.12 Both groups, however, view
family law as the central battleground for these arguments about same-
sex marriage.
terms of relationships and the terms of their demise"). This individualism harms not only
other family members, but the individual himself, who feels the "waning of belonging."
Hafen, supra note 5, at 32.
8. See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig, Status, Contract and Covenant: A Review of Family
Law and the Pursuit of Intimacy, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1573, 1574-75 (1994) (advocating the
concept of covenant to describe family relationships, which avoids the sexist and hierarchi-
cal connotations of status while going beyond contractual conceptions of private bargain-
ing between individuals); Schneider, supra note 5, at 1806.
9. See, e.g., Naomi R. Cahn, The Moral Complexities of Family Law, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 225, 245 (1997) ("Rather than questioning the morality of contemporary discourse in
family law, the new family morality movement recognizes that contemporary family law
celebrates a range of different moral values."); Jane C. Murphy, Rules, Responsibility and
Commitment to Children: The New Language of Morality in Family Law, 60 U. Prrr. L.
REV. 1111, 1115 (1999) (arguing that "contemporary family law has not retreated from
morality," but that values now "reflect both a broader understanding of morality and a
reconceived notion of rights within the family").
10. See, e.g., Cahn, supra note 9, at 228-29; Martha Minow, Forming Underneath Eve-
rything that Grows: Toward a History of Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 819, 894.
11. See, e.g., Don S. Browning, Linda McClain's The Place of Families and Contempo-
rary Family Law: A Critique from Critical Familism, 56 EMORY L.J. 1383, 1400 (2007)
(book review).
12. See, e.g., REGAN, supra note 6, at 120-22.
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B. THE PROBLEM
The perspectives of both of these groups of family law scholars are
problematic for several reasons. First, both groups focus on familial
bonds and, to varying degrees, minimize the needs of individuals in fami-
lies. Unfortunately, "individuals" in this context almost always means
women. For women, a focus on their own autonomy can positively im-
pact their lives in families. Second, the talk about moral values, however
defined, ends up hurting women, so that we should stay away from argu-
ments about infusing moral values through familial relationships. Third,
these scholars seem unconcerned with the fact that family law has been
tossed by the wayside in legal discourse in the past and continues to be
shunned in a variety of ways. Fourth, the diminishment of individual
needs in family law has had important negative consequences in its rela-
tion to the development of constitutional privacy law and served to in-
crease its own irrelevance to important constitutional debates. Therefore,
I question whether family law can serve the purpose of guiding us
through current controversies in gender relationships, and individual and
family autonomy.
In the next section, I examine my first two concerns, family law's char-
acterization of a focus on individual rights as selfish and the centrality of
moral values in family law, through a discussion of the Court's most re-
cent case on reproductive rights, Gonzales v. Carhart.13
II. GONZALES V. CARHART: FAMILY VALUES
A. SELFISHNESS, REVISITED
An underlying theme of those scholars proposing a re-focusing on col-
lective responsibility and commitment within families is that family rela-
tionships are distinct because they demand self-sacrifice and repudiate
self-interested behavior. Interactions within the family "derive [] from
an unlimited personal commitment, not merely to another person, but to
the good of the relationship or the family entity as a larger order."'14 For
some family law scholars, individual autonomy promotes the selfishness
of family members toward one another.15 Couples fail to make lasting
commitments and parents abandon childrearing responsibilities for their
13. 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
14. Hafen, supra note 5, at 23; see also Brinig, supra note 8, at 1595-96 (noting that
unlike parties to a contract, family members are willing to "give beyond what is fair");
Dolgin, supra note 6, at 1566-67 (arguing that though the traditional family may have sanc-
tioned inequality, it "also fostered a sense of responsibility anchored in the dictates of
natural and sacred truth" and advocating for maintaining this sense of responsible commu-
nity within the family while abandoning its traditional inequalities).
15. Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1443, 1511-13
(noting the shift in focus on marriage as an important societal institution to one that can
promote individual happiness). Singer also describes .the change in the view of parenting
as important to children and society to a view in which parenting is an opportunity for
adult personal fulfillment. Id. at 1513-14.
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own convenience and self-interest. 16 Moreover, a focus on individual
rights of family members may be a "dubious privilege," because this very
focus will destroy the family as an institution that mediates between the
individual and the state; when this happens, there is no reason for pro-
tecting traditional family privacy.17 But even if they do not believe that
contemporary families are being destroyed by individualism, many family
law scholars still focus on the need for self-sacrifice in families, particu-
larly when the needs of children are involved. 18
This concentration on selflessness in family relationships is worrisome,
however, because it generally falls to the wives and mothers to sacrifice
and take responsibility; it is their individual autonomy that seems to be
selfish.' 9 And in order to prevent selfishness, it is women's autonomy
that must be sacrificed. When the talk is of family bonds, connection, and
the moral values of responsibility, ultimately women have lost their abil-
ity to make their own decisions and define their own lives.
A portion from the majority opinion in the recent case of Gonzales v.
Carhart provides a striking example of the way selfishness is invoked to
deny women autonomy. In Gonzales, the Court upheld the constitution-
ality of the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, which
criminalized certain medical procedures that are used to terminate a
pregnancy in the second trimester.20
In its analysis of how the Act furthers the state's legitimate interest in
the potential life of the fetus, the Court undertook a lengthy explanation
of a woman's feelings in making a decision to terminate a pregnancy. The
explanation is breathtaking in its arrogance. Without apology, the jus-
tices purported to speak for women during and after the decision-making
process. While noting that "we find no reliable data to measure the phe-
nomenon," the majority stated that "it seems unexceptional to conclude
some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once
16. Hafen, supra note 5, at 30.
17. Dolgin, supra note 6, at 1559, 1567-68. See also Lynn D. Wardle, Tyranny, Federal-
ism, and the Federal Marriage Amendment, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 221, 249-55 (2005)
(discussing the importance of the marital family as a mediating structure that nurtures
moral values and promotes civic virtue); Anne C. Dailey, Constitutional Privacy and the
Just Family, 67 TUL. L. REV. 955, 958-60 (1993) (arguing against a view of constitutional
rights that focuses on individual privacy, while failing to recognize the critical role of the
family as a mediating institution that creates a responsible citizenry).
18. Dailey, supra note 17, at 1019-20 (arguing that while the constitutional doctrine of
individual privacy rights does provide autonomy to women that they did not previously
have, "it nevertheless sacrifices the domestic virtues of altruism, love and dependence").
Dailey argues for a commitment to family, which includes just family relations that can
serve to promote political citizenship in our democracy. Id. at 1023-27.
19. See Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1561 (1991) (arguing that although the liberal image of autonomous
individuals making choices in their own self-interest is facially gender-neutral, it is in fact
"covertly gendered"). Williams notes that "the ideology of conventional femininity con-
demns mothers who pursue self-interest over their children's needs as 'selfish."' Id.
20. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1619 (2007).
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created and sustained. '21 Therefore, "[s]evere depression and loss of es-
teem can follow." '22
The Court explained that for this reason, some doctors will hide from
women the actual details of the procedures that they will use to terminate
the pregnancy. 23 Because the particular procedure banned by the Act
may be especially upsetting, it is likely that it will not be explained to
women. This lack of information concerning "the way in which the fetus
will be killed" is of legitimate concern to the state, because it has an inter-
est in ensuring that the woman's decision is well informed.24 And, if wo-
men receive information about this procedure, it is "a reasonable
inference" that the result will be "to encourage some women to carry the
infant to full term, thus reducing the absolute number of late-term abor-
tions," and to encourage doctors to find different and "less shocking"
procedures. 25 Therefore, "[tlhe State's interest in respect for life is ad-
vanced by the dialogue that better informs the political and legal systems,
the medical profession, expectant mothers, and society as a whole of the
consequences that follow from a decision to elect a late term abortion.
26
This strained rationalization of the way in which the Act serves a legiti-
mate state interest is based on an unsupported and patronizing view of
women and their decision about whether or not to terminate a pregnancy.
The justices assumed that women are anxious and emotional; doctors
need to hide the truth about the procedure from them; women would be
even more depressed when they learn afterwards how the abortion was
performed; if women knew in advance, at least some would not proceed
with an abortion and the state's interest in protecting the potential life of
the fetus would be served.
Further, this analysis bears no relation to the regulation that is actually
at issue here. The Act does not require that a woman receive full infor-
mation on the procedure to be used to terminate the pregnancy; it bans
the procedure entirely. There is no "dialogue" and no fully-informed de-
cision by the woman; her decision is taken away. 27 While the Court's
explanation appears to empower women to make a well-informed deci-
21. Id. at 1634. See also Williams, supra note 19, at 1568 (arguing that the rhetoric of
abortion as freedom to choose has harmed the reproductive rights movement, because it
falls into the traditional view that characterizes a woman's decision not to have children in
favor of a career or other personal goals as "selfish").
22. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1634. See also LINDA MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES
AND CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 239 (2006) (noting that the joint opinion in Casey up-
held informed consent and waiting periods for abortions because "women are at risk for
serious psychological consequences from abortion choices because they are ignorant about
what abortion is").




27. See id. at 1648-49 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[T]he solution the Court approves,
then, is not to require doctors to inform women, accurately and adequately, of the different
procedures and their attendant risks. Instead, the Court deprives women of the right to
make an autonomous choice, even at the expense of their safety.").
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sion, the Act it upholds actually undermines a woman's ability to decide
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.
The Court begins this section of the opinion with the statement that
"[r]espect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the bond of love
the mother has for her child."' 28 After analyzing the steps the opinion
takes, the relevance of this statement becomes clear. The woman's un-
natural rejection of this "bond of love" and her guilt for making the self-
ish decision to terminate her pregnancy necessitates that the state take
away her choice to use the abortion procedure at issue in the Act. The
regret and severe depression she suffers after her choice to terminate her
pregnancy escalates to a "grief more anguished and sorrow more
profound" when this particular procedure is used, and she realizes that
"she allowed a doctor to pierce the skull and vacuum the fast-developing
brain of her unborn child, a child assuming the human form."'29
This depiction of the guilt-ridden woman selfishly making a decision
she will come to regret stands in sharp contrast to the view of a woman's
decision-making autonomy described in the part of the opinion in
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey which struck
down a spousal notification provision.30 The Casey Court explained how
such a provision would effectively enable a husband to veto his wife's
choice, and that a woman's inability to control decisions about childbear-
ing would deny her ability to participate fully in society.31 The Casey
Court made the connection between a woman's decision-making auton-
omy and her dignity, personhood, and citizenship. In her dissent in Gon-
zales, Justice Ginsburg pointed out how the majority's analysis had failed
to understand the link between independent decision-making and full
personhood that had been made in Casey.32
We need to be wary of promoting an ideal of selflessness in family rela-
tionships. As Gonzales shows, if women do not conform to this ideal,
they may be condemned as self-interested and unnatural in their rejection
of "the bond of love the mother has for her child."' 33 And it is this selfish-
ness that permits the state to curtail her right to make choices about
childbearing and, ultimately, to deny her full autonomy.
B. MORAL OBJECTIONS
It is apparent that a moral vision of the family, which is nostalgic for
traditional family structure and excludes alternative visions of intimate
relationships, is harmful to women. It is therefore understandable why
some commentators have attempted to win back the morality issue by
arguing that alternative family structures are not immoral but simply pro-
28. Id. at 1634.
29. Id.
30. 505 U.S. 833, 887-98 (1992).
31. Id. at 897-98.
32. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1640-41, 1649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
33. See id. at 1634.
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mote a different set of moral values focused on equality, fairness, and
commitment.34 In my view, however, putting alternative visions of family
in moral terms can lead to the narrowing of women's choices and rights.
The Gonzales majority's moral argument in support of restricting abor-
tion rights demonstrates this concern.
To buttress its argument that the state's interest in banning the abor-
tion procedure is legitimate, the Gonzales Court announced that "[n]o
one would dispute that, for many, D&E is a procedure itself laden with
the power to devalue human life."' 35 The problem, according to the Court,
is that the procedure bears a "disturbing similarity to the killing of a new-
born infant. ",36 Therefore, it would be legitimate for Congress to conclude
that this procedure "implicates additional ethical and moral concerns that
justify a special prohibition. '37 Just as the state can ban assisted suicide
because it could lead to involuntary euthanasia, the Court reasoned, Con-
gress can ban an abortion procedure because it seems close to infanti-
cide.38 Because we know that infanticide is wrong, apparently we can
limit abortion because it makes some of us morally queasy too. The anal-
ogy made by the Court is inapt for several reasons, the most obvious of
which is that abortion, unlike assisted suicide, has been recognized as a
fundamental right. But according to the Court, the assisted suicide exam-
ple demonstrates that Congress can ban all "practices that extinguish life"
when they are close to conduct that is illegal. 39 The "moral concerns" of
the state thus justify the restriction on a woman's right to decide whether
or not to terminate a pregnancy.
As the dissent pointed out, the rationale of the Court's argument is not
limited to the abortion procedure at issue in the case and could apply to
prohibitions on any abortion.40 The moral concerns evoked by the Court
"are untethered to any ground genuinely serving the Government's inter-
est in preserving life," and their use to justify legislation restricting mat-
ters of intimate choice is directly contrary to prior Court holdings.41
As both Casey and Lawrence v. Texas42 made clear, moral beliefs are
not legitimate bases for laws governing intimate relationships. 43 When we
let morality in as a basis for determining intimate relationships, we open
the door to the kind of argument exemplified in Gonzales. Moral values,
no matter how we may want to define them, lead to moral judgments that
we cannot control. Family law places women's equality in jeopardy when
it places morality at the center of familial relationships.
34. See supra text accompanying notes 9-10.
35. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1633.
36. Id. (citing congressional findings).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1633-34 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 732-35 (1997)).
39. Id. at 1634.
40. Id. at 1647 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
41. Id.
42. 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003).
43. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1647-48 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Part III now considers the past and present treatment of family law by
the courts and the legal academy. Both tell a sad story of isolation and
rejection. The question is whether family law, at least as currently consti-
tuted, can be the locus for resolving the central issues of familial
relationships.
III. THE BANISHMENT OF FAMILY LAW
A. THE FAILURE OF FAMILY LAW TO GARNER COURT ATTENTION
Our history is replete with judicial statements on the impropriety of
addressing family relations in a legal context. Because legal actions in-
volving family relations often served as a proxy for claims concerning wo-
men's rights, the exclusion of these relationships from court consideration
also had the effect of banning analysis of claims by and about women.
The North Carolina Supreme Court expressed this view concisely in the
nineteenth century case of State v. Black.44 Unless violence by a husband
against his wife is excessive:
the law will not invade the domestic forum or go behind the curtain.
It prefers to leave the parties to themselves, as the best mode of in-
ducing them to make the matter up and live together as man and
wife should.45
Courts widely refused to consider claims involving conduct during mar-
riage, even where the usual justification of preserving marital harmony
was inapplicable. They based this refusal on a broad reading of the prin-
ciples of coverture, in which a married woman could have no legal iden-
tity separate from that of her husband. For example, in Abbott v. Abbott,
a divorced woman sued her former husband in tort for injuries he in-
flicted on her while they were married. 46 Cynthia Abbott did not debate
that she could not have brought this suit against her husband while they
were still married. She argued, however, that when injuries occur during
marriage, a tort cause of action between spouses is suspended, but not
destroyed.47 Now that she and her husband were divorced, she could
bring this suit. The Maine Supreme Court disagreed. It was not simply
that the cause of action could not be brought during marriage; it was that
no right had been created that could give rise to any future cause of ac-
tion: "[tihere is not only no civil remedy but there is no civil right, during
coverture, to be redressed at any time. There is, therefore, nothing to be
suspended. '48 Marriage is "a perpetually operating discharge of all
44. 60 N.C. (Win.) 266 (1864).
45. Id. at 267.
46. 67 Me. 304, 304 (1877). Among other acts, Ransom Abbott had assaulted his wife,
Cynthia, restrained her with chains and transported her into an insane asylum where she
was imprisoned. After she escaped, Ransom continued to threaten and harass her, so that
she was forced to flee the state and go into hiding.
47. Id. at 306.
48. Id.
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wrongs between man and wife, committed by one upon the other. ' 49 Not
only is this the law, but it is also good policy, according to the court,
because otherwise divorce would open "new harvests of litigation" be-
tween former spouses, and "the private matters of the whole period of
married existence might be exposed by suits." 50
The states' passage of Married Women's Property Acts that began in
1839 and continued through the 19th century had little effect on the
courts' view that wives were not able to sue their husbands. For example,
in Bandfield v. Bandfield,51 subsequent to divorce, a wife brought a tort
action against her former husband for infecting her with a venereal dis-
ease while they were married.52 Michigan's Married Women's Property
Act stated that "[a]ctions may be brought by and against a married wo-
man in relation to her sole property, in the same manner as if she were
unmarried. '53 The Michigan Supreme Court interpreted the statute not
to include the right of a wife to sue her husband for personal wrongs
committed during the marriage.54 This would be a clear abrogation of
long-established rules of common law, and if this was the legislature's
intent, it must state so explicitly; otherwise the law presumes that the Act
did not intend to make such an alteration. To do otherwise, would be
"another step to destroy the sacred relation of man and wife, and to open
the door to lawsuits between them for every real and fancied wrong,-
suits which the common law has refused on the ground of public pol-
icy."'55 Despite the enactment of Married Women's Property Acts in the
19th century, it was well into the 20th century before most states abro-
gated inter-spousal tort immunity.56
In the past twenty years, though the inter-spousal immunity doctrine
has faded, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly asserted that the law
cannot provide a remedy for wrongs occurring between family mem-
bers.57 Castle Rock v. Gonzales is only the most recent decision in this
49. Id. at 307.
50. Id. at 308. In Callow v. Thomas, 78 N.E.2d 637, 640-41 (Mass. 1948), the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court applied the same principle to a marriage that had been
annulled.
51. 75 N.W. 287 (Mich. 1898).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 288.
55. Id; see also Peters v. Peters, 42 Iowa 182, 184-85 (1875) (noting that despite eleven
assaults and batteries by her husband, including one for which he was criminally convicted,
a wife could not bring tort action against husband under statute which stated that a wife
could "prosecute and defend all actions at law or in equity, for the preservation and protec-
tion of her rights and property, as if unmarried").
56. See, e.g., Merenoff v. Merenoff, 388 A.2d 951, 962 (N.J. 1978); Waite v. Waite, 618
So. 2d 1360, 1361 (Fla. 1993); see also Bozman v. Bozman, 830 A.2d 450, 475 (Md. 2003).
57. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189
(1989); Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992). As Elizabeth Schneider has noted,
"[i]n our society, law is for business and other important things. The fact that the law in
general claims to have so little bearing on women's day-to-day concerns reflects and under-
scores their insignificance." Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L.
REV. 973, 978 (1991).
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line of case law. 58 Jessica Gonzales brought a federal § 1983 action
against the city of Castle Rock and its police department, claiming that
her due process rights were violated when law enforcement failed to ar-
rest her estranged husband despite her increasingly urgent reports that he
was violating the terms of a domestic violence protection order.59
Gonzales' husband had taken their three daughters from the front yard
of her house where they were playing early one evening.60 This violated
the terms of Gonzales' protection order against her husband. When she
realized that her children were missing, Gonzales repeatedly called police
to ask them to enforce her protection order, but the police continued to
ignore her requests over several hours.61 In the early hours of the follow-
ing morning, Gonzales' husband arrived at the police station and opened
fire with a handgun he had purchased earlier that evening. Police re-
turned fire, killing him. The officers then looked inside his truck, where
they found the bodies of all three daughters whom he had already
murdered. 62
The case focused on whether a person who had obtained a protection
order had a constitutionally protected property interest, and therefore a
claim under § 1983, in having police enforce the order when they had
probable cause to believe it had been violated. The relevant Colorado
statute stated: "A peace officer shall use every reasonable means to en-
force a restraining order," and that
[a] peace officer shall arrest, or, if an arrest would be impractical
under the circumstances, seek a warrant for the arrest of a restrained
person when the peace officer has information amounting to proba-
ble cause that ... the restrained person has violated or attempted to
violate any provision of a restraining order .... 63
The actual protection order form issued against Gonzales' husband con-
tained a warning to respondents and a notice to law enforcement that
explained the arrest requirement using the statutory language. 64
Gonzales argued that both the terms of the protection order and the
state statute required police to make an arrest when they had probable
cause to believe that the person against whom the order was issued had
violated its terms. If the person could not be located, police were re-
quired to seek a warrant for his arrest. Gonzales claimed that these re-
quirements provided her with a property interest in the order's
enforcement. By failing to do so, the Castle Rock Police Department
deprived her of her procedural due process rights. 65
58. 545 U.S. 748 (2005).
59. Id. at 751.
60. Id. at 753.
61. Id. at 753-54.
62. Id. at 754.
63. Id. at 758-59 (citing Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-6-803.5(3) (1999)).
64. Id. at 751-52.
65. Id. at 754-55.
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The Court held, however, that no such property interest was created,
and so Gonzales had no claim against the police department under
§ 1983.66 The Court found that the state statute did not create a property
interest because its language did not make arrest upon violation of a pro-
tection order compulsory. The Court seemingly ignored the plain mean-
ing of the statute to argue that: "We do not believe that these provisions
of Colorado law truly made enforcement of restraining orders mandatory.
A well-established tradition of police discretion has long coexisted with
apparently mandatory arrest statutes. ' 67 Therefore, "a true mandate of
police action would require some stronger indication from the Colorado
Legislature than 'shall use every reasonable means to enforce a re-
straining order. .. 68
This conclusion violated the Court's own well-settled view that the
plain meaning of a statute's text is the first and primary source of statu-
tory interpretation. 69 Its interpretation was also at odds with the clear
legislative intent to strengthen state laws and protections for victims of
domestic violence.70 The Court's reading of the statute simply strains
credulity in a manner reminiscent of state courts' implausible interpreta-
tions of the Married Women's Property Acts to bar women from suing
their spouses. 71 The Court's decision in Castle Rock continues the long
tradition of keeping claims between family members out of court. The
decision barred the use of federal civil rights claims in these matters, but
it also undermined the right of a family member to seek redress for inju-
ries by another member in the state courts. The right to a protection or-
der loses value if there is no right to its enforcement. 72 Castle Rock
exemplifies the lengths to which the Court continues to go to avoid con-
sideration of what it perceives to be matters of family relations.
The domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction provides an-
other example of the way that courts have shown their disregard for fam-
ily law. In cases dating back to Barber v. Barber,73 the Supreme Court
66. Id. at 768.
67. Id. at 760.
68. Id. at 761.
69. See, e.g., Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108(1980) (noting that where there is no clearly expressed intention to the contrary, language
of the statute itself is ordinarily "conclusive"); Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249,
253-54 (1992) ("When the words of a statute are unambiguous... [the] 'judicial inquiry is
complete."') (citations omitted). For a more extensive discussion of how the majority's
explanation of the Colorado statute contradicted the theory of statutory interpretation of
the opinion's author, Justice Scalia, see Emily J. Sack, The Domestic Relations Exception,
Domestic Violence, and Equal Access to Federal Courts, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1441, 1505-08
(2006).
70. See Brief of Peggy Kearns, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 12,
Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (No. 04-278) (noting that the bill included
provisions which toughened civil and criminal penalties to hold batterers accountable and
deter them from committing future acts of violence).
71. See supra text accompanying notes 51-56.
72. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union, et al. in Support
of Respondent at 21-24, Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (No. 04-278).
73. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1858). The domestic relations exception can be traced to
the following dicta in Barber: "We disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the
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has explained that the federal courts are not the proper venue for resolv-
ing family disputes, even where these matters meet the requirements for
federal diversity jurisdiction. This position, however, is not simply the
quaint view of nineteenth century judges. Despite the lack of a convinc-
ing rationale, the Supreme Court has continued to uphold the exception.
in cases involving child custody,74 as well as divorce, alimony, and marital
property awards.75
The demands of family justified a quite literal exclusion of women from
the courts. Women could not or were not required to participate in jury
service through the mid-twentieth century because they were needed at
home. In the 1961 case of Hoyt v. Florida, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of a state statute which provided that no female would
be taken for jury service unless she had affirmatively registered with the
clerk her desire to be called for jury duty.76 Gwendolyn Hoyt was
charged with killing her husband, and was convicted of murder by an all-
male jury.77 She challenged the jury service statute on equal protection
grounds, arguing that it imposed the burden of voluntary registration
upon women, but not upon men. The Florida Supreme Court rejected
this claim. The absolute exclusion of women from jury service in the past
was based "upon the inconsistency of such demands with their role in
society."'78 If total exclusion of women has been held constitutional, the
court reasoned, then a regulation imposed on women's eligibility for ser-
vice cannot be unconstitutional. 79 The Court stated that:
Whatever changes may have taken place in the political or economic
status of women in our society, nothing has yet altered the fact of
their primary responsibility, as a class, for the daily welfare of the
family unit upon which our civilization depends. The statute ... sim-
United States upon the subject of divorce, or for the allowance of alimony, either as an
original proceeding in chancery or as an incident to divorce a vinculo, or to one from bed
and board." Id. at 584.
74. In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890).
75. See generally Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162 (1899); see also Ohio ex rel. Popovici v.
Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 383 (1930); De La Rama v. De La Rama, 201 U.S. 303, 310 (1906).
The Court has based the domestic relations exception on various theories, such as the
historical limitations on English chancery jurisdiction that were incorporated into the
American court system and the inability of a divorce to be quantified in monetary terms, so
that it fails the amount in controversy requirement of federal diversity jurisdiction. See
Sack, supra note 69, at 1481-92 (2006). In its most recent direct pronouncement, the Court
acknowledged that the exception was not constitutionally based and noted the weakness of
the various rationales for its existence. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 695 (1992).
However, the Court ultimately upheld the exception, relying on Congress' long acceptance
of the Court's interpretation of the Judiciary Act to exclude domestic relations cases, as
well as principles of stare decisis. Id. at 700; see also Sack, supra note 69, at 1449-55. Jana
Singer has made the point that even at the state level, the push to make custody and di-
vorce matters the subject of mediation rather than judicial procedure also "reflects, in part,
a sense that our judicial system should be reserved for matters more important than do-
mestic conflicts." Singer, supra note 15, at 1562.
76. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 61 (1961).
77. Hoyt v. State, 119 So. 2d 691, 693 (Fla. 1959), affd, 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
78. Id. at 694.
79. Id.
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ply recognizes that the traditional exclusion was based.., upon the
premise that such demands might place an unwarranted strain upon
the social and domestic structure .... 80
Therefore, women should have the right to decide whether jury service
would risk impairing "their more vital role."8 1 The U.S. Supreme Court
affirmed.8 2 Because women remain "the center of home and family life,"
the Court found that it was not unreasonable for a state to conclude that
a woman should be relieved of jury duty unless she determines that this
service "is consistent with her own special responsibilities. '8 3
Family relationships were barred as a subject for consideration by the
courts and married women were barred as litigants. In addition, because
of their obligations to their families, women were discouraged, if not out-
right excluded, from jury service until well into the twentieth century.8 4
Here again, moral values and the promotion of selflessness in family rela-
tions acted to restrict women's autonomy. If women had "special respon-
sibilities" to their families, what would it mean if they decided to
volunteer for jury service? Apparently, they selfishly would be neglecting
those responsibilities while also "placing an unwarranted strain upon the
social and domestic structure."
B. THE INVISIBILITY OF FAMILY LAW IN FEDERAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The Supreme Court has also made clear its view that family law is fun-
damentally unimportant to federal legislation or constitutional adjudica-
tion. For example, in determining the scope of congressional authority
under the Commerce Clause in United States v. Lopez, the Court ex-
pressed the fear that, without limits, Congress could go so far as to make
family law.8 5 Intimate family activities could be connected to interstate
commerce: "Under the dissent's rationale, Congress could just as easily
look at child rearing as 'fall[ing] on the commercial side of the line' be-
cause it provides 'a valuable service-namely, to equip [children] with the
skills they need to survive in life and, more specifically, in the work-
place." 8 6 To the Court, the idea that child rearing could be a matter of
federal legislation was so apparently ludicrous it proved the point that
without boundaries in its Commerce Clause power, Congress could
wander into totally inappropriate territory.8 7 The dissent agreed that
80. Id.
81. Id. This "privilege" was distinct from a blanket exclusion of women based on al-
leged hardship. Id.
82. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 61 (1961).
83. Id. at 62. The Court noted that this reasoning may not apply to women without
family responsibilities but concluded that it was not irrational for a legislature to prefer the
broad exemption of all women rather than having to make individual decisions. Id. at 63.
84. Hoyt was effectively overruled by the Court in 1975. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522 (1975).
85. 514 U.S. 549, 565 (1995).
86. Id. (alteration in original).
87. See Sack, supra note 69, at 1496.
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"marriage, divorce, and child custody" were areas that were beyond Con-
gress' authority. 88
Even a superficial review of federal legislation for the past thirty years
reveals that, in fact, Congress has devoted substantial energy to family
law issues, including child welfare, custody, and child support.89 Congress
also has been involved in the regulation of marriage, both directly and
indirectly.90 In this context, the Lopez Court's dismissal of family law as
a subject for federal legislation is startling.9' Apparently, federal family
law was invisible to the Court.
The treatment of the civil rights provision of the Violence Against Wo-
men Act,92 both during the drafting of the legislation in Congress and at
the Supreme Court in United States v. Morrison,93 highlights the fear that
federal courts will be responsible for any family law issues.94 As part of
comprehensive legislation to address domestic violence, the civil rights
provision created a private cause of action against any person who com-
mitted a "crime of violence motivated by gender" and allowed any person
88. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 624 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
89. See, e.g., Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform Opportu-
nities Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-266 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 701-709); Adoption Assis-
tance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 670 et seq.); Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
611, 94 Stat. 3569 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A); Child Support Recovery Act of 1992,
Pub. L. No. 102-521, 106 Stat. 3403 (1992) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 228); Family and Medi-
cal Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654);
Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204, tit. VI, 110
Stat. 2935, 2936 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1185); Personal Responsibility and Work Opportu-
nity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 103(a)(1), 110 Stat. 2105, 2129
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 607(e)(2), (g)); Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L.
No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-07); Deadbeat Parents Punish-
ment Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-187, 112 Stat. 618 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 228). See also
Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1297, 1373-
85 (1998) (cataloguing areas of federal legislation involving family law); Laura W. Morgan,
The Federalization of Child Support-A Shift in the Ruling Paradigm: Child Support as
Outside the Contours of "Family Law," 16 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW 195, 210-11
(1999).
90. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified as
amended at 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C). Congress has also considered a Federal
Marriage Amendment to the Constitution as recently as the summer of 2006.
91. See Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 870-71
(2004) (arguing that in the traditional family law canon, family law is not a part of federal
law, which allows opponents of a specific federal family law to argue that it cannot be
permitted simply because "any form of federal family law is unprecedented and
inappropriate").
92. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-22, 108 Stat. 1902-55 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). The civil rights provision was codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (1994), invalidated by United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000).
93. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
94. For more comprehensive discussions of the civil rights provision and Morrison, see
generally Sally F. Goldfarb, The Supreme Court, the Violence Against Women Act, and the
Use and Abuse of Federalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 57 (2002); Julie Goldscheid, Advanc-
ing Equality in Domestic Violence Law Reform, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 417
(2003); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Disputing Male Sovereignty: On United States v. Morri-
son, 114 HARV. L. REV. 135 (2000); Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction,
Gender, and the Globe, 111 YALE L.J. 619 (2001).
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injured by such a crime to obtain compensatory damages, punitive dam-
ages, and any injunctive, declaratory, or other appropriate relief.95
Though no intimate or family relationship between the parties was re-
quired to bring an action under the provision, from the start of its draft-
ing there was concern that plaintiffs would be able to join family law
claims such as divorce to the civil rights action, thereby allowing family
law matters into federal court.96 Chief Justice Rehnquist and an ad hoc
committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States weighed in
with the concern that the provision could involve federal courts in a pan-
oply of "domestic relations disputes. ' 97 The final version of the legisla-
tion explicitly prohibited the joining of divorce, alimony, marital
property, or child custody claims to any case brought under the civil
rights provision.98
Though potential family law matters had been excised from the provi-
sion, they resurfaced as a focus of the Supreme Court's concern in United
States v. Morrison.9 9 And, though there was no intimate or family rela-
tionship element in the cause of action and the case at issue involved a
stranger rape, the Court persisted in treating the civil rights provision as a
species of family law. 100 As such, it was not within the scope of federal
law.101 Repeating the concern it voiced in Lopez, the Court stated that
without limits on congressional power under the Commerce Clause, there
would be no barrier to federal legislation in areas of clear local concern,
such as family law, "since the aggregate effect of marriage, divorce and
95. § 13981(c).
96. See Judith Resnik, Reconstructing Equality: of Justice, Justicia, and the Gender of
Jurisdiction, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 393, 402 & n.39 (2002).
97. See REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD Hoc COMMITEE ON GENDER-
BASED VIOLENCE 1 (1991); William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice's 1991 Year-End Report on
the Federal Judiciary, THE THIRD BRANCH, Jan. 1992, at 3. Chief Justice Rehnquist had
made clear his concern about federal court involvement in domestic relations cases well
before this statement. In his dissent in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), a case
which held that due process required a standard of at least clear and convincing evidence
in a state termination of parental rights proceeding, then-Justice Rehnquist argued against
imposing a federal standard on state family law: "if ever there were an area in which fed-
eral courts should heed the admonition of Justice Holmes that 'a page of history is worth of
volume of logic,' it is in the area of domestic relations. This area has been left to the States
from time immemorial, and not without good reason." Id. at 770 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(quoting New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)). See Hasday, supra note
89, at 1305-06.
98. § 13981 (e)( 4 ) ("Neither section 1367 of title 28 nor subsection (c) of this section
shall be construed, by reason of a claim arising under such subsection, to confer on the
courts of the United States jurisdiction over any State law claim seeking the establishment
of a divorce, alimony, equitable distribution of marital property, or child custody decree").
99. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
100. The Court, noting that family law could not be the basis for congressional author-
ity under the Commerce Clause, stated: "Congress may have recognized this specter when
it expressly precluded § 13981 from being used in a family law context. Under our written
Constitution, however, the limitation of congressional authority is not solely a matter of
legislative grace." Id. at 616. Despite efforts to distance the legislation from family law,
according to the Court, Congress had not succeeded.
101. As the Court famously put it, "[tihe Constitution requires a distinction between
what is truly national and what is truly local." Id. at 617-18.
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childbearing on the national economy is undoubtedly significant. 10 2 The
provision was therefore beyond Congress' authority under the Commerce
Clause and, thus, unconstitutional.10
3
The Court failed to recognize the extensive federal legislation that ex-
ists on family matters, and found that anything it characterized as family
law (whether it actually involved families or not) could not be within fed-
eral jurisdiction. The concept that family law can be a focus of federal,
and therefore national, attention seemed unfathomable to the Court.
Ironically, one piece of federal legislation involving family matters that
the Court was happy to consider and uphold was the Partial-Birth Abor-
tion Ban Act of 2003.104 The statute refers to "[a]ny physician who, in or
affecting interstate or foreign commerce," so that Congress apparently
relied on its Commerce Clause authority. 10 5 The Gonzales majority as-
sumed this in passing, but did not discuss Congress's power to enact such
a law.106 Only Justice Thomas, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice
Scalia, raised the issue and noted that it was not before the Court.
10 7
When discussing abortion rights, the Court accepted Congress's charac-
terization of the law as involving regulation of physicians and not family
decision-making. Even in this depiction, however, it seems clear that the
doctors' medical practice and the performance of the abortion procedure
were "local," rather than in or affecting interstate commerce. While the
abortion procedure in question concerned issues of reproduction and de-
cisions on child-rearing which are central to family law, the Court did not
label this legislation as family law, though it certainly was more closely
related to family issues than the civil rights provision struck down in Mor-
rison. One explanation may be that unlike Morrison, Gonzales con-
cerned the constitutional right to privacy which, as we will see in the next
section, has been severed from family law.
C. FAMILY LAW'S REJECTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Family law is invisible in federal law in another sense. Though it can be
argued that the leading developments in modern constitutional law have
been in the area of family law, the line of substantive due process and
equal protection cases involving the right to privacy, including Gris-
102. Id. at 615-16.
103. Id. at 617. The Court also found that Congress lacked authority to enact the provi-
sion under Section 5 of the 14th Amendment. Id. at 627.
104. 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (upheld in Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007)); see supra
text accompanying notes 14-33.
105. 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a) (Supp. II 2003).
106. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1638.
107. Id. at 1640 (Thomas, J. concurring) ("I also note that whether the Act constitutes a
permissible exercise of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause is not before the
Court. The parties did not raise or brief that issue; it is outside the question presented; and
the lower courts did not address it.").
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wold,108 Eisenstadt,10 9 Loving,110 and Roe,"' are rarely characterized as
family law cases.1 2
The tension between the constitutional right to privacy cases and family
law has its roots in the conception of the family as a mutually dependent
and supportive entity in which individual rights must be sublimated.1 1 3
Critics of individualism as an important element of the modern family
point to the constitutional right to privacy jurisprudence as a demonstra-
tion of the havoc in family structure created by a concentration on indi-
vidual rights. The Supreme Court's recognition of access to
contraception regardless of marital status, 1 4 access to abortion by a wo-
man without her husband's consent or notification," 5 and the ability of a
minor to obtain an abortion without parental consent, 1 6 all focus on indi-
viduals and their rights, rather than on their status as members of a fam-
ily, with the relationships and obligations that status requires." 7 In
addition, the constitutional decisions seem to support "a more general
right of autonomy in sexual conduct, which would reflect displacement of
marital status as the basis of distinctive sexual rights."" 18
Conversely, advocates for women's rights have been wary of the con-
cept of privacy as it relates to the family, for good reason. The traditional
view of family privacy derives from a vision of society as divided into
separate spheres: the "public" world of the state and the market and the
"private" world of the family. This private sphere functioned as a domes-
tic sanctuary, offering comfort and support, to which women were con-
fined and in which men could be nurtured to compete in the public
sphere." 9 Though the domestic sphere was the domain of women, it was
108. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that right of married couples to use contraception is
protected under the Constitution).
109. 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding that a statute that denied single people access to
contraception while permitting married people to do so violated the Equal Protection
Clause).
110. 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding anti-miscegenation statute unconstitutional).
111. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the right to choose abortion is a fundamental
right protected under the Due Process Clause).
112. While family law textbooks and courses routinely cover significant areas of consti-
tutional law, to the "outside world" of law practitioners and law school colleagues, family
law denotes a narrow field of the common and statutory law of divorce, custody, and prop-
erty division. Jill Hasday argues that family law is often treated as though it cannot oper-
ate within another body of law at the same time. See Hasday, supra note 91, at 872.
Therefore the line of cases starting from Griswold may fall into constitutional legal catego-
ries like substantive due process or equal protection, but they are family law decisions, too.
Id. at 882.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 6-8, 14-18.
114. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
115. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52 (1976); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887- 898 (1992).
116. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
117. REGAN, supra note 6, at 39-40.
118. Id. at 40. Though Milton Regan was writing before Lawrence v. Texas, presumably
he would see that decision as further recognition by the Court of individual sexual auton-
omy, whether inside or outside of marriage.
119. Id. at 21-25. While disavowing the gender inequities of the traditional "private
sphere," Regan argues that the family may benefit from a return to the concept of "status,"
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controlled by men who alone were able to enter the public sphere. Cov-
erture ensured that married women had no independent access to the
public world, and the state would not interfere in this private sphere,
thereby offering no legal recourse for these women to redress inequi-
ties.120 This meant that the power held by husbands and fathers over
women and the inability of married women to have any legal or public
identity was not disturbed.121 It was this view of the family as a separate
sphere that rationalized the state's failure to intervene in domestic vio-
lence. 122 The legacy of this view, which justified non-intervention by the
state and left women alone in hierarchical, and often violent, family rela-
tionships, demonstrates the continuing "dark and violent side of pri-
vacy."'1 23 Therefore, scholars and advocates concerned with women's
rights have been dubious about linking the concept of privacy to
family. 124
However, the constitutional right to privacy, as it has developed to in-
clude individual autonomy, is far different from the traditional concep-
tion of family privacy. 125 While the recognition of constitutional privacy
rights benefits individuals beyond their role in the traditional family, it
also can promote the rights and equality of individuals within families.
Moreover, the broadening of the constitutional right to privacy can also
broaden the definition of family. Therefore, a focus on constitutional
rights to individual autonomy and privacy has much to offer family law.
Both the supporters of the selfless family and women's advocates con-
cerned about the harms of privacy, however, have placed family law at
odds with the development of the constitutional right to privacy. In turn,
the development of constitutional jurisprudence is conceived as separate
from the family and family law. Scholars preoccupied with the current
in which family members are subject to clear expectations and duties, in contrast to the
modern atomistic view of the family as a collection of individuals guided only by personal
desire and fulfillment. Id. at 9-13, 30-33, 89-117.
120. Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Women's Subordination and the Role of
Law, in THE POLInCS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 328, 331-32 (3d ed. 1988); see
also Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1505-06, 1521-22 (1983).
121. Taub & Schneider, supra note 120, at 328.
122. Schneider, supra note 57, at 984-85 ("The concept of privacy encourages, rein-
forces, and supports violence against women .... Privacy operates as a mask for inequality,
protecting male violence against women."). See generally CATHERINE A. MACKINNON,
TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989).
123. See Schneider, supra note 57, at 974-75, 998 (noting that the challenge is develop-
ing a right to privacy as an aspect of autonomy, distinct from the traditional doctrine of
state nonintervention).
124. Scholars have argued that due to the oppression associated with privacy, the right
to privacy is too limiting a constitutional basis for promoting women's autonomy, such as
the right to reproductive choice. See, e.g., Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitu-
tion, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 1020-21 (1984); Schneider, supra note 57, at 997-98.
125. The right to privacy in constitutional law quickly expanded from its focus on the
family as a unit, see e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), to individuals, either
within or outside the family. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). See also Schneider,
supra note 57, at 995-96; Singer, supra note 15, at 1510-11.
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debates in family law have failed to embrace individual autonomy as part
of family relationships and failed to focus on the reality that family mem-
bers are also individuals. Therefore, they have missed the opportunity to
incorporate the benefits of privacy into family law. In so doing, they have
rendered family law irrelevant in the central battleground for the consti-
tutional privacy rights. As the next section demonstrates, on a more prac-
tical level, this separation of family law from constitutional law also has
had an important impact on the value placed on family law in the
academy.
D. FAMILY LAW IN LAW SCHOOLS: LIFE IN THE GHETrO
The treatment of family law in the legal academy replicates and assists
in perpetuating its isolation by the court system. Again, the regard with
which family law is held is integrally related to the legal system's view of
women. In law schools, the devaluing and separation of family law is ex-
emplified by its identification as a "female" subject taught overwhelm-
ingly by female law professors. Moreover, the conceptual separation of
constitutional law from family law reinforces the lack of prestige awarded
to family law. Despite the central role of family law in legal practice and
the focus on family and intimate relationships in developing constitu-
tional law, the teaching of family law is an afterthought in the legal
academy. 126
In her recent study of female law professors and the courses they teach,
Professor Marjorie Kornhauser reaches the disturbing conclusion that, as
the number and proportion of female law professors has increased, there
has been an accompanying growth in segregation by gender of courses
taught.1 27 Moreover, the courses which have become increasingly and
most strongly identified as "female" are those which hold lower status in
law schools. 128 Family law is one area in which there is a significant over-
126. See Nicholas Bala, There Are Some Elephants in the Room: Being Realistic About
Law Students, Law Schools, and the Legal Profession When Thinking About Family Law
Education, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 577, 580 (2006) ("The reality has been that, within law
schools in North America, family law has been low in the hierarchy of subjects for special-
izations and has received a disproportionately small amount of attention compared to the
number of practitioners in this area, its volume of cases in the court system, and its impor-
tance for society. At many law schools, there are no or few advanced family law offerings,
and clinical and internship programs in family law are not common.").
127. Marjorie E. Komhauser, Rooms of Their Own: An Empirical Study of Occupa-
tional Segregation by Gender Among Law Professors, 73 UMKC L. REV. 293, 295 (2004).
Kornhauser studied the gender distribution of law professors by courses taught from the
1990-1991 year to the 2002-2003 year. Id. at 296.
128. Id. at 295. Kornhauser posits that some courses can be classified as either "male"
or "female" courses, defined as courses thought to exhibit traits generally associated with
traditional gender categories. Id. at 306. She defines a "male" course as having one or more
of these traits: it covers what the academy considers a core legal subject such as Evidence
or Corporations; it is a traditionally prestigious area of the law within law schools, such as
Constitutional Law; and it is a prestigious area of law practice because it has high status
clients, high fees, high intellectual content, or involves a lot of scientific or regulatory work,
such as Intellectual property, Corporate Finance, Federal Taxation or Antitrust. Id. at 307.
Conversely, a "female" course has one or more of the following characteristics: it is a topic
traditionally of interest to women, and which involves personal relationships, such as Fam-
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concentration of female law professors. 129 This over-concentration in
family law has increased absolutely, so that even as the proportion of law
professors that are women has grown, so has the gender distortion. 130
Kornhauser notes that in 1990-1991, Family Law ranked as the course
with the third highest absolute female disparity, lower only than Women
and the Law and Juvenile Law.13' In 2002-2003, Family Law had moved
up to the course with the second highest absolute female disparity, rank-
ing lower only than Women and the Law. 132
Though the over-concentration of women law professors in courses
such as Family Law no doubt has several explanations, one hypothesis
proposed by Kornhauser has resonance: "the increased percentage of wo-
men law professors allows male professors to leave less prestigious
courses to females. 133 In other words, in the past, someone had to teach
family law courses, and since there were so few female law professors,
that person was usually a man. As more women entered the legal acad-
emy however, male professors were able to move on and leave the lower
status courses to the women.
ily Law or Juvenile Law; it is considered "softer" law, such as Poverty Law, as compared to
traditionally more doctrinal or hard core subjects such as Contracts, Conflicts, or Federal
Courts; it is a traditionally less prestigious area of the law within law schools, such as Legal
Writing or Clinical Law; or it is a less prestigious area of law practice, such as Immigration
Law. Id. See Elizabeth Basile, False Starts: Harvard Law School's Efforts Toward Integrat-
ing Women into the Faculty, 1928-1981, 28 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 143, 180 n.280 (2005)
(discussing an interview with Professor Tamar Frankel, who noted that tax and securities
law were considered "male law subjects," as compared to areas traditionally taught and
practiced by women, such as Trusts and Estates and Family Law).
129. Kornhauser, supra note 127, at 302 (noting that in 2002-2003, the percentage of law
professors that were women was 31.8%; however, the percentage of women law professors
teaching Family Law was 58.8%). Other studies also have noted the overconcentration of
female professors teaching family law courses. See, e.g., Deborah Jones Merritt & Barbara
F. Reskin, Sex, Race, and Credentials: The Truth About Affirmative Action in Law Faculty
Hiring, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 258-59, 264-65 (1997) (observing that in a study of profes-
sors who began tenure-track appointments at law schools between Fall 1986 and Spring
1991, after controlling for variables such as credentials and experience, white women were
significantly more likely than white men, men of color, and women of color to teach Family
Law, and the proportion of women of color teaching Family Law was higher than the
proportion of both white men and men of color who did so).
130. Kornhauser, supra note 127, at 329 app. 1. In 1990-1991, the percentage of law
professors that were women was 21.7% and the percentage of women law professors that
were teaching Family Law was 41.0%. In 2002-2003, the percentage of law professors that
were women was 31.8%, while the percentage of women law professors that were teaching
Family Law was 58.8%. Thus, the gender distortion grew from 19.3% in 1990-1991, to
27.0% in 2002-2003. Id. In the very early days of women law professors, their numbers
were so few, and their concentration in certain subject areas was so high, that the gender
distortion was even greater than in recent times. See Donna Fossum, Women Law Profes-
sors, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 903, 905.
131. Kornhauser, supra note 127, at 334 tbl. 1A.
132. Id. at 337 tbl. 2A.
133. Id. at 312. Kornhauser proffers other explanations as well, such as response to
"stereotype threat," where a stereotyped person underperforms when she undertakes a
non-stereotyped activity, because she believes that her performance will confirm the nega-
tive expectations that others have of her. Members of stereotyped groups often avoid situ-
ations where they feel the threat so as not to endanger their self-esteem. Id. at 322-24.
[Vol. 61
The Burial of Family Law
Many scholars have noted that new female law professors are often
steered or assigned to teach what administrators think of as "female" sub-
jects.134 Conversely, mentors to women law professors often urged them
to avoid being tainted by association with these areas. Judith Resnik has
quoted such advice that she was given early in her teaching career by one
colleague: "Be careful. Don't teach in any areas associated with women's
issues. Don't teach family law; don't teach sex discrimination. Teach the
real stuff, the hard stuff: contracts, torts, procedure, property. 135
This gender disparity in courses taught can have a downward spiral.
While family law may already have been viewed as a low status area, the
predominance of female law professors in this area itself further lowers
its status. 136 The fact that women are "more likely to teach Family Law
than Anti-trust or Constitutional Law, further buttresses the belief that
women faculty are second-class faculty. ' 137 And as long as women dis-
proportionately teach what are considered "peripheral" courses, they will
134. See, e.g., Deborah Jones Merritt, Are Women Stuck on the Academic Ladder? An
Empirical Perspective, 10 UCLA WOMEN'S L. J. 241, 244-45 (2000) (observing that in a
comparative study of women and men entering law school teaching in the late 1980s and
followed through the 1990s, men were significantly more likely to teach Constitutional
Law, while women were significantly more likely to teach Trusts and Estates or skills
courses; "[e]ven when a woman looks just like a man-on paper anyway-she is hired at a
lower rank and assigned to teach less prestigious courses"); Kornhauser, supra note 127, at
324 (hypothesizing that women may feel "steered," often unconsciously, to traditionally
feminine courses by administrators, peers, or mentors); cf. Basile, supra note 128, at 183-84
(2005) (reporting that in 1979, when Martha Field was offered a tenured position at
Harvard, "Dean Sacks assured Professor Field that she would continue to teach Federal
Courts and Constitutional Law and would not be shuffled into the courses most often
taught by women, such as Trusts and Estates, Family Law, and Women and the Law").
135. Judith Resnik, Gender Bias: From Classes to Courts, 45 STAN. L. REV. 2195, 2195
(1993). Resnik notes that this type of advice is not an historical artifact, but that she has
repeatedly heard from women law professors about similar warnings they received. Id. In
discussing the evaluation of women law professors for tenure, Marina Angel has argued
that "[w]omen's writing on women's subjects is often considered insubstantial and unwor-
thy. Women writing in the traditional areas for women, such as family law and juvenile law,
are dealing in 'soft areas' which are thought to be unworthy of serious consideration."
Marina Angel, Women in Legal Education: What It's Like to be Part of a Perpetual First
Wave or the Case of the Disappearing Women, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 799, 833 (1988).
136. See Bala, supra note 126, at 581 (noting that family law has traditionally been an
area in which large numbers of women practice, and advanced family law courses in law
school tend to have relatively large numbers of female students, which may be "subtly
related to the low status of family law within the legal academy"); Michael Ariens, The
Politics of Law (Teaching), 13 LAW & Soc. INoUIRY 773, 777 (1988) (reviewing MICHAEL
LEVIN, THE SOCRATIC METHOD (1987)) ("If a female law professor teaches and a female
student studies family law, sex discrimination, or trusts, wills and estates, those courses
might be viewed as unimportant compared with courses in the "important" corporate
area."); Kornhauser, supra note 127, at 325-36.
137. Kornhauser, supra note 127, at 326; see also Margaret V. Sachs, Women in Corpo-
rate Law Teaching: A Tale of Two Generations, 65 MD. L. REV. 666, 689 (2006) (noting that
many of the women who became law professors between 1968 and 1978 and who taught
corporate law believed that entering this field had "strategic value" because they demon-
strated "their ability to handle a demanding and technical subject and thereby their entitle-
ment to be taken seriously. They show they do precisely what their smart male colleagues
do."). Sachs adds that the flip-side of this was the "imperative of steering clear of tradi-
tional 'female' subjects such as family law and trusts and estates," and that several of these
professors had mentors who explicitly told them to avoid these areas. Id.
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"remain at the margins" of the legal academy.138
Of course, this gender disparity also impacts the development of the
law and the status of areas such as family law in the legal system. 139 If the
trend Kornhauser identified continues, family law teaching will become
more gender-segregated, leading to even greater isolation. Therefore, the
marginalization of family law by both the legal academy and the courts
does not seem destined to end anytime soon.
Our legal institutions are not taking family law seriously, which often
means that they are not taking women seriously. It does not seem that
we can count on critical issues of intimate relationships and family struc-
tures to be treated with any real understanding or reference to family law
principles. Despite the apparent prominence of the family in current de-
bates, I fear that these issues may be discussed and decided without the
insight or influence of family law and without concern for women in and
out of families.
CONCLUSION
Over the past several years, family law scholars have explored the de-
cline of the traditional family structure and have debated how a more
modern conception of familial relationships should be constructed. How-
ever, by attacking a perceived growth in the autonomy of individual fam-
ily members or minimizing the importance of this autonomy, and by
separating the family from developments in the constitutional right to pri-
vacy, we have allowed the legal system to continue on its traditional path
of ignoring family law and restricting the rights of women. And, by insist-
ing on the continued value of morality as a foundation for familial rela-
tionships, family law scholars have allowed the courts and legislatures to
justify these restrictions on moral grounds. Further, while these debates
have raged, its participants seem not to recognize that family law contin-
ues to be marginalized and disregarded when the decisions are made.
138. Kornhauser, supra note 127, at 328; Melissa Cole, Struggling to Enjoy Ourselves or
Enjoying the Struggle? One Perspective from the Newest Generation of Women Law Profes-
sors, 10 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 321, 337-38 (2000) (the hiring of women law professors has
been seen as an alternative to the tradition, rather than a change of the tradition: "[i]n
accepting the separate space that has been allotted to us as women, however, we also im-
plicitly accept our position at the periphery of an unchanging core"). See Angel, supra
note 135, at 833 (noting the contrast between the low esteem in which family law is held in
the legal academy and the fact that it is "perhaps the most explosive, changing, and impor-
tant area of the law today"); Bala, supra note 126, at 580 (observing that given the numbers
of family law court cases and the importance of family law issues to society, one might
expect that a significant number of law schools would have selected family law as one of
their areas of specialization, but that this has not occurred).
139. See Kornhauser, supra note 127, at 325-36. For an older article making the same
point, see Elyce Zenoff & Kathryn V. Lorio, What We Know, What We Think We Know,
and What We Don't Know About Women Law Professors, 25 ARIz. L. REv. 869, 903 (1983)(citing a 1977 American Bar Foundation study which found that securities, tax, and anti-
trust were considered the most prestigious areas of legal practice by the legal profession
with "the lowest prestige rating given to family law problems of indigent clients").
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Unless we confront the weaknesses in our own conceptions of this area of
the law and attack its treatment by the legal system, family law, together
with women's rights, will be buried for good.
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